Ich untersuche in meinem theoretischen Modell die Auswirkungen von Overconfidence von Wirtschaftsprüfern auf die Prüfungsauftragserteilung von Unternehmenseigentümern. In einem Investitions-Szenario werden anhand der Nutzenbetrachtungen des Wirtschaftsprüfers und des Unternehmenseigentümers Präferenzen abgeleitet. Die empirische Literatur deutet darauf hin, dass erhobene Prüfungsgebühren Rückschlüsse auf die angebotene Prüfungsqualität zulassen. Die Implementierung von Overconfidence führt in meinem Modell dazu, dass einige Wirtschaftsprüfer nicht adäquate Prüfungsgebühren erheben und somit ein geringeres Nutzenniveau erreichen. Dadurch sind aus Sicht des Unternehmenseigentümers die angebotenen Prüfungsgebühren kein perfektes Signal für die Prüfungsqualität des Wirtschaftsprüfers. Der Effekt von Overconfidence von Wirtschaftsprüfern ist bezüglich der Zielerreichung des Unternehmenseigentümers uneindeutig.

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We utilize region-day variation in actual vs. forecasted wet bulb globe temperatures (i.e. forecasting errors) to investigate the effects of the first comprehensive heat-health warning system in Japan. We find that heat alerts led to an increase in heat stroke counts of 17%. An analysis of mechanisms utilizing several datasets suggests the effect is due to increased reporting, as opposed to potential "adverse" behaviors or substitution in health diagnoses. We further find that four times as many heat strokes are detected in low-income neighborhoods compared to high-income neighborhoods, highlighting severe environmental inequalities in health reporting behavior.

We study the causal effects of monetary rewards for tax compliance on the willingness to declare using two survey experiments. Focusing on tax credits available to households that demand an invoice, we vary how the reward is obtained, the level of the reward, and whether the financial benefit is made salient. The effectiveness of the reward is highest when it is more consumer-friendly and the monetary incentive is high or when the financial advantage is made salient. The effect of salience is as high as the effect of increasing the rate of the tax credit by 10 ppts. However, we observe substantial free-riding: at least two thirds would have demanded an offer without invoice also without the monetary incentive.

Individuals in a group, who repeatedly experience that their group's policy selection system does not decide in their favor, often develop system disbelief. The notion that the system is not favorable for the group, i.e., system disbelief, may be detrimental to the performance and welfare of the group. It may affect group members’ psychological well-being and their willingness to provide work effort, make financial contributions, or participate in cooperative coordination. In this experimental study, I investigate whether giving individuals a voice, i.e., the opportunity to express and explain their preferences, mitigates the development of system disbelief when decisions are made by AI (ChatGPT) or by an independent human committee. The study adds to the knowledge on the drivers of discontent in group decision processes. It provides insights for managers and policymakers concerning the design of group decision processes that are welfare enhancing and resilient towards system disbelief.

The inflow of nearly one million refugees to Germany in the 2015 refugee crisis fueled widespread anti-foreigner sentiments and hostility. We study in first-difference regressions whether regional refugee inflows between 2014 and 2015 caused systematic increases in rates of victimization of foreigners (who are not refugees) in bodily injury crimes with German suspects. Our results indicate a positive and mildly humped shaped impact, which grows in size from 2015 to 2017 and then declines in 2018 to a level that still exceeds the 2015 level. For robbery, an economically-inspired crime, we find in contrast no evidence that foreigners suffered more at the hands of Germans (suspects) as a result of the inflow of refugees in 2015, neither immediately in 2015 nor in later years. This suggests that our finding on bodily injury crimes is unlikely to result from unobservable economic or other confounders at the county level that caused anti-foreigner crimes to rise with other crimes for reasons unrelated to anti-foreigner sentiments. A placebo test shows no indication that the county-level refugee inflows are systematically correlated with pre-crisis trends in foreigner victimization rates. Additional effect heterogeneity analyses show that the impact on foreigner victimization in bodily injury crimes is larger in East Germany and in counties where more Germans are victimized in crimes with refugee suspects.

Asymmetric information is a key element in different economic transactions and daily life. The disappearance or major reduction of such asymmetries can largely influence human behavior. A technology that can lead to such a shift is an algorithm that detects lies live based on facial expressions, voice, or head pose. In this article, we show how we produced a data set that can be used to train a lie-detection algorithm, developed such an algorithm, and investigated the economic effects of its application. In doing so, we adapt the experiment of Belot & van de Ven (2017) and examine lying behavior in the presence of asymmetric information in a buyer-seller game. In our design, sellers have monetary incentives to sometimes misreport their private information. We investigate the ability of buyers to detect lies via video conference, use the obtained video communication to develop a large lie-detection data set and train a lie-detection algorithm such that it can be applied in a laboratory setting. Results indicate that sellers lie and buyers are not good at detecting such lies. Further, we investigate the willingness of buyers to invest in different mechanisms to reveal the private information of sellers using various methods, including the self-developed lie detection algorithm. The results indicate low application rates of these mechanisms. We consider overconfidence and algorithm aversion as possible explanations.

Using administrative public health insurance records for one-third of the German working-age population, we link the quasi-experimental occurrence of heat waves by postal code over more than a decade to increases in sick leave and assess the implications for labor market inequality. On an average hot day, the number of sick leave cases increases by about 3.1%. With enduring heat exposure over five consecutive days, the effect grows by more than half. Heat-induced sick leaves distribute highly unevenly. Those who are already disadvantaged in terms of their income and working conditions are more vulnerable to heat stress. Workers who are more flexible in scheduling and adjusting their working hours are less at risk. Heat can also lead to fewer cases of absence in some workers. We document that female-dominated occupations with high interpersonal interaction exhibit fewer sick leaves because of less respiratory infections on hot days.

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