FAKULTÄT FÜR

WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFT

Horst Gischer, D.J. Jüttner:
Profitability and Competition in Banking Markets: An Aggregative Cross Country Approach

The relationship between profitability and competition in banking markets has been the focus of discussion for some time. Using the OECD Bank Profitability data base, the paper attempts to advance our understanding of the following issues on which no unanimity exists in the literarture. First, in order to assess banking market structures we employ the Lerner monopoly index as a proxy for market power. Second, our international database allows us to provide some insights into the nature of competition on a global basis. Our research points to its market power reducing effects. Third, as for risk we suggest a measure that is more in tune with the concept used in the Value-at-Risk-approaches than the contributions in the literature. The volatility of gross bank-income appears to capture the uncertainties of banking; it exerts a consistently positive influence on bank profitability and margins.

Karl Inderfurth, Stefan Minner:
Spieltheorie in Produktion und Logistik

Alvin E. Rath, Axel Ockenfels:
Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet

Gerhard Lindner, Udo Buscher, Simme Douwe P. Flapper:
An Optimal Lot and Butch Size-Policy for a Single Item Produced and Remanufactured on One Machine

Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt und Axel Ockenfels:
Retributive Responses

Atanasios Mitropoulos:
Little information, efficiency and learning - An experimental study

Bodo Sturm, Joachim Weimann:
Experimente in der Umweltökonomik

Axel Ockenfels:
Retributive Responses

Karl Inderfurth, Ch. Gotzel:
Performance of MRP in Product Recovery Systems with Demand, Return and Leadtime Uncertainties

Chun-Lei Yang, Joachim Weimann, Atanasios Mitropoulos:
Game Structure and Bargaining Power in Sequential Mini-Games: An Experiment

Various explanations for the behavior observed in sequential bargaining games have been offered in an attempt to explain recent empirical evidence. This paper proposes an explanation for behavior in two-player games that is based on an experiential assessment of the relative bargaining power of opponents by the players involved and does not require payoff maximization. It is called the stick-and-carrot heuristics. Experimental verification was conducted: first, four "classical" bargaining games were transformed into two-action sequential mini-games was compatible with the existing literature on the "classical" games in continuous action space; and finally, it was discovered that the stick-and carrot heuristics provided accurate predictions of behavior in some specially designed similar bargaining games. It also assisted in answering some questions posed by recent experimental results from a larger set of bargaining games. This research has shown that bargaining power is an important clue to the understanding of observed behavior and, furthermore, that the careful assessment of a game's structure is an essential element when formulating predictions concerning a player's likely behavior.

Gerd Lindner:
Simultanplanung von Fertigungs- und Transportlosgrößen - Ein Common Cycle Ansatz bei unterschiedlichen Transportlosgrößen

01002

Etienne Emmrich, Horst Schmitt:
Numerical Simulation of Economic Control Problems: A Model of Global Warming

01001

Ludwig von Auer:
An Axiomatic Check Up for Price Indices